






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

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THE
ALLIES
AND

The Late Ministry

Defended against

FRANCE

And the Present Friends of France

In Answer to a Pamphlet, Intituled

The Conduct of the ALLIES.

*Nulla salus bello? Capiti cane talia dantur
Dardanio, rebusque tuis*

The Second Edition

LONDON,

Printed for A. Baldwin near the Oxford
Arms in Warwick-Lane. 1712.

THE ALLIES

AND THE

LATE MINISTRY

DEFENDED,

Against FRANCE, &c.

THE Pamphlets that have been hitherto published in favour of an insecure and false Peace, have been most of them so meanly writ, that I have of late thought it lost Time to look into them; and by that means this Curious Piece of the *Conduct of the Allies and the late Ministers*, had escaped me, had it not been for the mighty Commendations *Abel* gives it in his *Post-Boy* of the 29th past; for whose Judgment I have so much Deference, that I could no longer delay looking into a Paper, in which I was to expect an infinite Number of undeniable Truths, and Truths indeed they are in *Abel's* Style, who has inverted the Sense of Words, and with his Friends is teaching the Nation a new Language, and to call things by the contrary Names to those they

have hitherto been known by. I could not read even a few Pages of this great Performance, without thinking of the *Medley's* Story of the *Colliers* and the *Sailors*; and methinks I see this Writer in almost every Page engaging to his Friends in the *Colliers* Words, that *tho' we can't make our selves as clean as they are, we shall quickly make them as black as our selves.* This is plainly the Design of this elaborate Piece; with what Success we shall see by going over it. But my Concern is not so much with the *late Ministry*, and the Arts us'd to blacken them, which are all in vain, and can only serve to make their Merit shine brighter in the End, which will infallibly be the Consequence of such an unjust and violent Persecution, as that with which they have been and are still pursu'd. What affects me in this and the like Attempts made upon the Reputation of the *late Ministry*, is the Purpose all this is chiefly intended to serve; and that is, to perswade us out of our Senses, to change all the Notions we have had of things for these twenty Years and more, and to give up contentedly all the Fruits of a most successful War in a mean inglorious Peace. I don't know what Effect this Master-piece of the Party may have on other People, but I must confess, a very hasty Reading of it has convinc'd me, that if what is advanc'd in it be the Sense of the Nation, a Peace is indeed necessary; for 'tis high time to make Peace with our Enemy, when we declare open War against all our Friends: Nay, could I suppose the Sense of the Nation would not be first asked in Parli.—t upon so important a Subject, the Spirit of this Pamphlet would convince me of what some People have a good while suspected, that our Peace was already made, and that a *Congress* was to be held for no other End, but for us to act the Mediators, and tell our Allies what

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Terms we expect each of them should be contented with. For if we were not sure of Terms for our selves, to insult our Allies in so open a manner, and to expose the Weakness of the Nation, and our Inability to continue the War, *would*; to use this Author's Words, *not only be very indiscreet, but might perhaps be dangerous.* Which is one of the Reasons this Writer gives, p. 78. for *not publishing his Discourse sooner*; but sure 'tis even now too soon, if the Bargain be not already made. Another Reason for his coming out so late, is, he says, *because he would give way to others, who might argue very well upon the same Subject from general Topicks and Reason,* (that is, declaim well) *tho' they might be ignorant of several Facts, which he had the Opportunity to know,* from which alone a true Judgment can be made, and which he therefore knew how to misrepresent; for I hope to convince every impartial Reader, that is all the use this Writer has made of his great Knowledge.

These are the two Reasons this Author thinks fit to give for *not publishing his Discourse sooner*; to which I will venture to add a third, as true a one as the last, and much truer than the first; for no body can believe he declin'd appearing sooner, because it might be *dangerous at this Juncture* to expose the ill Condition we are in, for that his Friends have already done in very ample manner; and if that were a Reason for not publishing two Months ago, 'tis as good a Reason still, unless, as I have said, the Bargain be made. The principal Reason therefore for publishing his Discourse no sooner, was to wait the critical Minute, which might be most likely to give it its Effect. The great Skill of Dealers in *Political Lies* consists in knowing how to time them nicely, and to proportion the Strength of the Colours to the Length of the Time 'tis in-

intended they should last. How much the Welfare or Misery of this Nation depends on the first Resolutions of the next Session, no body wants to be told; on them depends a good or bad Peace, provided it be not a thing done: 'Tis therefore of great Consequence to the Promoters of an ill one, to have a Flood of Lies in readiness to let out of a sudden on those, whom 'tis so much their Interest to surprize into wrong Measures, by the most artful Disguises they can use. It was with this View this Book did not make its Appearance till the Day appointed for the Session; in hopes the Members, deluded by the false Lights of so many pretended Facts, would go whither they should lead, without suspecting they were going wrong: And because there was, for Reasons of State, a Possibility that the Session might still be put off a few Days longer, as it has proved in the Event, it was contrived to be of such a Length, as might find many Readers Work for some Days, or at least make it impossible to give a timely Answer to it before the Resolutions were taken, which it was designed to influence.

But the Strength and Force of Argument, with which the opposite Side of the Question has been maintain'd in many Pamphlets, the evident Goodness of that Cause, the gross Misrepresentations of this Writer and his Friends, and the many Marks that appear throughout, of Malice and Falshood; the great Court that is made to *France*, and the strange rude Treatment of our best Allies, make me greatly hope, that these new Politicians will find themselves extremely disappointed; and that a *British Parl—t* will not, in a Matter of the utmost Consequence, believe what comes from so suspected a Hand, without hearing both Sides, and examining into the Facts themselves.

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As this Writer finds his Account in coming out late, and being long to serve an ill Cause, I shall, to serve a good one, take the contrary Course, and be as short as possible, that I may not appear to be too late in the Defence of that, which, when 'tis once gone, is never to be retrieved.

I shall, therefore, pass over many Pages of this Book, which contain nothing in them but general Reflections and Repetitions of the same thing; of which, in this elaborate Piece of Scandal, there are many Instances, as if it were not enough to misrepresent one Fact once, but it must be made, by Repetition, two or three; by which Artifice, all the Dirt that is thrown is multiplied, that the Allies and the late M—y might be sure to look black enough.

After many wise Reflections upon War in general, in order to tincture the unwary Reader's Mind with useful Prejudices for what is to follow, this Author descends to consider those Wars *England* has been engag'd in since the *Conquest*; upon which he wisely observes, That while we make War in our own Country, we carry no Money out of it; a great Commendation this of Civil Wars! Even the *Dutch Wars* in *K. Ch. II's* Reign did not carry out any Money, nor did it leave any Debts upon the Nation: And thus this Reign is past over, without any other Remark on't, but that those Wars were carried on under a very corrupt Administration; so corrupt a one, that I hope this Nation, in many Years to come, will not have seen above one more such: 'Tis to this Administration we owe the Change of the Balance of *Europe*, and the great Difficulties which the exorbitant Power of *France* has since reduc'd us to. Those *Dutch Wars*, as this Writer observes, were much to the Dishonour of the Crown; and so *Dutch Wars* very probably will always be, though this

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Author, in many Places, is sounding an Allarm, raising all the ill Blood he can, and infusing Jealousies between the two Nations, whose Interest it is to be in the most inseparable Union. Speaking of our Successes in *Flanders*, p. 28. he says, *We are destroying many thousand Lives, exhausting all our Substance, not for our own Interest, not for a thing indifferent, but perhaps to our own Destruction; we may live to feel the Effects of our Valour more sensibly than all the Consequences we imagine from the Dominions of Spain in the Duke of Anjou: We have conquer'd a noble Territory for the States, &c.* And, p. 71. *We, instead of labouring to make them safe (the Dutch) must beggar our selves to render them formidable.*

Had *K. Charles*, instead of those scandalous Wars against the *Dutch*, exerted himself with Vigour against *France*, the Expence of a few Millions then would have sav'd us an hundred since; but by his Treaties with *France*, and his Wars with *Holland*, he shew'd he was not in the true Interest of his Country; nor can any Prince be so, who, in succeeding Times, shall tread in the same Steps: Even his *Parl* — t, as corrupt as they were, could not be brought to give Countenance to such ruinous Measures; much less can any other *M* — y expect a *British Parl* — t will desert the Interest of the Nation, when its Liberties are establish'd upon so much a better Bottom than they were at that time.

From the *Dutch Wars* our Author passes to the *Revolution*, when a general War broke out, to check the ambitious Designs of *France*; and here the *Emperor*, the *Dutch* and *England*, were Principals. A little after we are told, *That the Ground of this War, as to the Part we had in it, was to make France acknowledge the late King, and to recover Hudson's-Bay.* That these were two of the principal Ends we propos'd by the War, is true; that it was the whole, is not true; for

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for as he says himself, the War was general, to check the Ambition of France, who had been for thirty Years encroaching upon their Neighbours, and had shewn they could be bound by no Treaties; to check this Ambition, therefore, was a general Concern, and a just Cause of entering into the War, to prevent that universal Monarchy, which had been compassed long since, if we had tamely sat still; for the K. of France had begun the War by the Invasion of the Empire the Summer before the Revolution; and had the Revolution been prevented or disappointed, there had then been an end of the Liberty of Europe, and of our own too; and therefore I beg Leave to observe by the Way, that the End of that War was not chiefly to settle the Revolution, which the Enemies of it would insinuate; 'twas necessary for the Preservation of our selves, and the Powers in Alliance with us, who, without us, wou'd have made no stand against France, and we must have necessarily been involv'd in the same Ruin with them. And to pretend the Sea was neglected, and the greatest Part of six Millions annually employed to enlarge the Dutch Frontier, because the King was a General and not an Admiral; and although King of England, a Native of Holland, is all ill grounded Scandal, that has at the bottom no Foundation; the Increase of the Power of France, upon the Continent, made it necessary to make the greatest Efforts against him there; and all that were made, were, as appear'd by the Event, too little: Nor did that Service, after all, employ the greatest part of 6 Millions, as any body may see by the Estimates laid before the Commons every Session, for the Flanders War. As to the Fleet, 'twas so far from being neglected, that we not only recover'd the Disgrace we received in the beginning of the War off of Beachy, but afterwards in a successful Engagement

we made such a Destruction of the Naval Strength of France, that they never appear'd again at Sea all that War. But let us see what an Account is given of the End of this War, *After the Loss of an hundred thousand Men, and a Debt remaining of twenty Millions, a Peace was concluded with great Advantages to the Empire and Holland, but none at all to us, and clogged soon after by the famous Treaty of Partition.* I would be glad to know, whether England has no Advantage in a War they engage in to check the Ambition of France, if France be considerably weaken'd by the advantageous Terms given to the Empire and Holland? Whether those Terms are not transferring so much Strength from the Side we would weaken to those we would support? And if so, whether the Reason of going into such a War is not answer'd, and we may not properly be said to find our Account in it? But had it not been to raise an Odium against the late King, this Author would not have said, *that War was concluded with great Advantages to the Empire and Holland, but none at all to us;* for he very well knows, it was a very disadvantageous Peace to the Allies, very short of what they propos'd, and the natural Effect of an unsuccessful War; and why that War succeeded no better, he can tell us too if he pleases: It was the Effect of the Opposition of a discontented Party, of unhappy Misunderstandings between Prince and People, of late Sessions, and ill Trade, and a bad Credit, which was the necessary Consequence of the rest. These and the like Causes made it impossible for the King to push the War with Vigour, and if France made better Offers to put an End to it, than the Confederates from their ill Successes could expect, 'twas no Secret what that was for, 'twas that he might be at leisure to pursue his Designs upon the Spanish Monarchy, which succeeded.

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but too well by his Management of the *Partition-Treaty*, which this Author knows the King was forced into, as the lesser of the two Evils, the Nation in all Appearance being neither in Temper, nor, as he was made to believe, in Condition to begin a new War; and having no body of Troops that could be able to make Head against *France* upon the King of *Spain's* Death, who was in a most languishing Condition at the time the *Reswick-Treaty* was made; which was the true Reason the King of *France* was in so much haste to put an end to that War, and promis'd so readily to give up many Places to *Spain*, which, if his Design on that Monarchy succeeded, was in Effect giving to himself. But as to the Advantages to the Empire and *Holland*, I know none he gave the last but an advantageous *Tariff*, of which he never executed one Article; and for the *Empire*, People must have short Memories to forget, how he embroiled them by the 4th Article about Religion, with what Contempt he treated the Emperor about *Strasburg*, and how he after the Peace refused to surrender *Old Brisac*, till he had built *New Brisac* just over against it, which was to all Purposes defeating the Design of the Restitution of that important Place. But to comfort our selves for the Loss of Men and Money in this War, this Writer could have told us, that Monsieur *Vauban* in his *Dispute Royal* reckons *France* at the end of that War weaker by two Millions of Men than before, and gives us such a miserable Account of the Poverty of the People, and of the Increase of the King's Expence, beyond what the Kingdom could bear, as might be some Consolation to us at the end even of such a War; if the Usurpation of the *Spanish* Monarchy had not been built upon the Peace that concluded it. In this War began the Custom among us of borrowing Mil-

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Wons upon Funds of Interest. This is represented in this and other Places of this Book as a most detestable Project, a Plot to ruin the landed Interest, and there is nothing bad enough to be said of it. Sometimes 'tis imputed, to the Security of a new Prince not firmly settled on the Throne, sometimes to a Design of a few cunning Men, to involve the Nation in Debt, and enrich themselves; sometimes to the ambitious Views of a Ministry. Any Reason, in short, is given for it, but the true one; for 'tis certain, this Method of raising Money was not taken up by Choice, but Necessity: There were a Set of Men in Parliament at that time, whose Merit it was to oppose the Court right or wrong; and there was nothing these Patriots so much abhorred, as any thing that look'd like an Excise, which the Nation has insensibly in great measure come into since; and had they done so at first, there might have been almost the same Sums rais'd without any Debt upon the Nation. And after all, there is nothing in this Method of raising Money by Funds of Interest, but what all other Nations engag'd in these Wars have come into as well as our selves, and before us; so that in this respect we are upon the same foot with other People, but so much better as our Debts are less than those either of *France* or *Holland*, as every body knows that is acquainted with foreign Affairs, and has any Insight into Political Arithmetick.

Our Author having brought down his History to the present War, and spent six Pages in raising as much Dust as he thought necessary to shew his Tricks in without being presently discover'd, which, considering how ignorant most Readers are of foreign Affairs, how generally we love Scandal, how weary we all are of a long War, and how pleasing that has made the very Name of Peace, to those whom

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whom Sounds persuade as well as Sense, is no very hard matter for a Person much less skilled in the Arts of Juggling, than this Writer must be allowed to be. After a Prologue of 20 Pages, this Part of a History opens with this noble Proposition, *That no Nation was ever so long or so scandalously abused by the Folly, the Enmity, the Corruption, the Ambition of its domestick Enemies, or treated with so much Insolence, Injustice, and Ingratitude by its foreign Friends.* And this he undertakes to make appear by plain Matters of Fact.

Tho' I can't by any means consent my Country should be ruined by an ill Peace, when we have so fair a Prospect of a good one, which is the plain Design of this Writer and his Friends; yet if this Proposition can be prov'd, I will readily consent the late M—y should be given up to the Fury of their Enemies, provided the same Justice may be done on their Accusers, if it cannot.

The Proposition to be prov'd is indeed at first sight so strange a Paradox, that the Undertaker must have a great Opinion of his Skill in secret History to venture at it; and I have reason to think this is not his first Essay: He is much improv'd since this time Twelve month, and now boldly affirms the grossest Falsties, which he then scarce dared to hint at. Then the M—y only were attack'd, and that upon some Points only, the Allies were spared, or rather good Words were given them; but now there is nothing too bad to be said of the late M—y; all is wrong in their Administration from beginning to end; and, for their Comfort the Allies are as bad as themselves. In short, both Allies and Ministers are Fools and Knaves, and all the Virtue and Wisdom in the World lies in two or three Hands, where nobody before ever thought there was any; but with this surprizing Difference, that

Affairs

Affairs have for many Years succeeded to a Miracle under this sottish and corrupt Management, when 'tis next to a Miracle if this new Virtue and Wisdom do not ruin us. But to come to our Author's Proofs of what he has wish so much Truth and Modesty advanced; he will make his Proposition good by proving these three Points.

" First, That against all manner of Prudence or common Reason we engag'd in this War as Principals, when we ought to have acted only as Auxiliaries.

" That we spent all our Vigour in pursuing that part of the War which could least answer the End we proposed by beginning it; and made no Efforts at all where we could have most weaken'd the Common Enemy, and at the same time enrich'd our selves.

" Lastly, That we suffer'd each of our Allies to break every Article in those Treaties and Agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the Burden upon us.

Every one of which Propositions I will shew to be scandalously false, and consequently the Proposition they are to prove is no less so. And the hard Words of *Folly, Temerity, Corruption* and *Ambition*, can properly belong to none but those from whom they come.

His first Proposition, That to engage in this War as Principals, is against all manner of Prudence or common Reason, is so very new and extraordinary, that I heartily congratulate him upon this great Discovery. He is the first Writer I have met with of his Side, who has had the Hardiness to speak so plain, tho' 'tis what I have long suspected to be their meaning; and 'tis no wonder they are in so much haste to get out of the War any how, since they now openly declare 'twas wrong to go into it. This is a Key to the whole Book,

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Book, and nothing that follows, no Reflections on
 the late M——y, no ill Usage of our Allies, no
 Endeavours to explain away Treaties, no absurd
 Opinion about Credit, not even his thinking the
 Fall of Stocks upon the Change of the M——y,
 a good Omen, can seem strange after such an extrava-
 gant Declaration as this, which contradicts the
 Sense of all the Parliaments we have had, since the
 Usurpation of the *Spanish* Monarchy, the unani-
 mous and constant Sense of the Queen and her Al-
 lies, the Sense even of the present Parliament; nay
 what's more, the Sense even of these Writers them-
 selves a Year ago. For then they had not brought
 themselves to think at this absurd rate, or did not
 think it time to tell the Nation so. That the Ju-
 stice and Necessity of the War has been all along
 allowed and insisted on by the Queen and her Al-
 lies, and by all our Parliaments till this last, has
 been shewn by so many Collections of Speeches,
 Addresses and Votes, as well as by the Articles of
 the several Treaties made with our Allies, that I
 shall not repeat any thing that has been already
 publish'd of this kind, but shall take notice rather of
 what has not been so much observed, and that is
 the Sense of the present Parliament, especially of
 the Lords in their *Representation* presented to her
 Majesty the 10th of *February* last, in the second
 Paragraph of which, they applaud her Majesty's
 engaging generously in this War for asserting the Li-
 berties of *Europe*, and the Rights of the House of
Austria to the *Spanish* Monarchy, which had been
 wrested from them by the Artifices and Usurpa-
 tions of the French King, when a Prince of that
 illustrious Family came to her Majesty for Refuge
 against Oppression; and that her Majesty had re-
 ceived him into her Protection, moved thereunto
 not only by her own innate Goodness, but by the
 Voice

Voice of her People too, who were ready to sa-
 crifice their Lives and Treasure for the Support of
 her Majesty in defence of so righteous a Cause :
 And as the Fruits of a successful War they mention
 the Honour of her Majesty, the Safety, Wealth, and
 Prosperity of her own Dominions, and the lasting Peace
 of Europe: And the Commons in the second Pa-
 ragraph of their Representation speak of the absolute
 Necessity of carrying on the War, to say nothing
 of the Assurances both Houses gave her Majesty
 in their Address at the Opening of the Sessions.
 So that our Author's Proposition is directly con-
 trary even to the present Parliament, which I re-
 commend to the Consideration of those Gentle-
 men, who have in due Veneration and Esteem the
 Sentiments of this P-----t, how much soever they
 may undervalue all preceding ones; tho' I can't
 but put them in mind that there has been even in
 their own Opinion one P-----t this Reign, as
 good as the present; I mean the first, which yet
 declar'd their Sense of the Justice of the War, and
 the Necessity of pushing it with vigour, as much as
 any that came after them; but this Writer's Asser-
 tion is not only contrary to the Sense of the present
 P-----t, but I presume I may add of the present
 M-----y last Session, since no body can have any
 Pretence to suspect that their Sentiments upon this
 Point differ'd at that time, whatever they may do
 now: But what makes the monstrous Absurdity of
 this Proposition still more evident, is, that 'tis incon-
 sistent with the Sense of these Writers themselves a
 Year ago. For in the many scandalous Pamphlets of
 that memorable Year, which came no doubt out of
 the same Mint with that now before me, there is not
 one word to condemn our manner of engaging in
 the present War, as imprudent or unreasonable, or
 ill advised; and yet these Writers have sufficiently
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shewn, they wanted no Inclination to blacken the
 late M——y, their Malice was work'd up to the
 last pitch, and 'twas extremely for their purpose to
 say all the ill of them they could devise, true or
 false ; and by what they have said, one may be
 sure they left nothing unsaid, which they thought
 cou'd hurt their Reputation ; and the Silence of
 such keen Adversaries must be allowed to be a con-
 siderable Argument, that they did not then think
 the engaging the Nation in the present War any
 Crime ; and that such an Accusation was at that
 time too gross to pass upon the Nation.

But how now comes that which was right a Year
 ago to be exclaim'd against as *imprudent* and *against all
 reason*, and to be made a capital Crime in the late
 M——rs? How comes it to be now declar'd,
 that the Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy was
 none of the Ends that engag'd *Britain* in the pre-
 sent War, that her Majesty by the Grand Alliance
 is not oblig'd to it, and that 'tis Madness to think
 of it? How can this mighty Difference in the
 same Persons in so short a time be reconciled? Is
 it that they have really chang'd their Sentiments,
 and by the force of wrong thinking for a Twelve-
 month together, have at last brought themselves to
 be in love with such absurd Notions, in opposition
 to their own Sense, as well as to that of all Man-
 kind besides? Or are they indeed not in these Sen-
 timents themselves, but think it convenient to im-
 pose them on the People, as soon as they are pre-
 par'd by the Poison they have with so much Dili-
 gence for some time infused into them? If this last
 be the case, I confess, a Twelve-month is but a
 reasonable time to prepare a Nation for such Ab-
 surdities; a Nation, not trained up in Ignorance
 and Slavery, can't bear to have all the Notions they
 have been bred to, with respect to publick Affairs,

contradicted at once; a free People, that have been used to reason about *Liberty*, and *Trade*, and *Alliances*, and *Peace*, and *War*, can't of a sudden resign their Understandings implicitly to the strange Dictates of their new Masters: 'Twill require time to manage such a People to their own turn; and if this mighty Change can be compassed even in a Year, they must be allowed to be able Politicians. And this, I confess, I take to be the true Reasons why these Secrets in Politicks have not been produced sooner. Things were not ripe for it; and even now, it seems, they don't think fit to bring these monstrous Propositions into the light, without a Guard of Reasons, such as they are, before to make way for them, and another to secure the Rear. To judge of the Strength and Goodness of these Reasons, I shall take them out of the confused Order they are in, which is not confus'd by Chance, 'tis the *most proper* for the Nature of Deceit, and most agreeable to the Genius of the Author, if I am not extremely mistaken in my Guess of him. The Substance then of what he urges in Proof of his first Proposition is this: *Upon the Duke of Anjou's succeeding to the Monarchy of Spain, in breach of the Partition-Treaty, the Question here in England was, Whether the Peace should be continu'd, or a new War begun?* Let me add, That the King had a little before chang'd hands, and taken in a *Tory* M—y, but was thought to be still influenc'd very much by those he had parted with. The new M—rs and their Friends were against beginning a new War, *by reason of the Debts and Difficulties we labour'd under*, that *France* was now much more formidable than in the last War, by the Accession of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy, and the Alliance of *Cologne* and *Bavaria*: By which means he reckons the Allies would be weaker upon the Balance by
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one hundred and twenty thousand Men than last War, the Success of which we had no Reason to boast of. He might have added, that besides *Cologne* and *Bavaria*, France had engag'd on their Side the Duke of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Savoy*, and the King of *Portugal*; but the first perhaps was pass'd over, because the Mention of it would make too much for the Honour of the then Emperor, who had the Courage to begin this War alone, and made a successful Campaign in *Italy* against the whole Power of *France*, and made his way into the *Milanese*, between the Duke of *Mantua* on one side, and the Duke of *Savoy* on the other. 'Tis hard to say, whether the Courage or Wisdom of the Court of *Vienna* in this Enterprize was most wonderful; for 'twas impossible to begin a War under greater Disadvantages: It put the Emperor to a vast Expence, which his Condition could very ill bear, and ruined a Body of the bravest Troops and best Officers then in *Europe*; but he thought all was at stake, and therefore was resolv'd to venture all: The Justice and Necessity of his Case, which would draw the Fate of all *Europe* after it, made him wisely judge, that *England* and *Holland* would not be idle Spectators, while *France* was grasping at Universal Monarchy, and, I may say, had it in her Hands. Thus he judg'd, and thus it prov'd: And to that glorious Enterprize of his we owe it, that there was room for beginning a new War, without which the Liberty of *Europe* had been long since lost without Retrieve; and therefore if some of the Failures charged on the House of *Austria* in the Sequel of this Libel, were as great as this Author would have them thought, this first and wonderful Campaign in *Italy* makes no small Amends, and at the same time accounts for them; for it wasted so much of the Emperor's Treasure, as he has no way been able to make up; and that great but necessary Expence then has

unavoidably made all their Efforts weaker ever since.

This impartial Writer sinks this Campaign upon us, and that we might not think of it, declines mentioning the Duke of *Mantua* and the Duke of *Savoy* here in their proper Place. But there was another Reason for his not mentioning the last and the King of *Portugal*. 'Twas very much to his Purpose to tell us, they were in Alliance with *France*, since that increased so much the more the Danger of the War; but then it would have led his Reader to reflect on the Wisdom and Abilities of the M—y he was to run down, that they were able to bring off from *France* two such considerable Allies: And it would at the same time have furnish'd an Answer to the Objections he makes to the Treaty entered in with *Portugal*; for can any body suppose a Prince actually engag'd in Alliance with *France* could be brought off, without offering him very favourable Articles, or engaging to secure him as effectually as we could against the Resentments of the side he left, whose Nearness and Naval Force he had great Reason to be apprehensive of; and therefore if such an Alliance was worth having, as I dare say every body then thought it was at any rate, 'twas not only just and reasonable, but absolutely necessary to give him all possible Assurances of Protection: Which could no way be done but by a Squadron of Ships at his Service. This was the least we could promise; and no body but a Fool can imagine, that this was giving up a part of our Fleet to his Caprice or Humour, as this Author would insinuate, so as that the Queen or her Admirals would not use their own Discretion, if he pretended to send our Ships upon ridiculous or unreasonable Services, which could not be supposed to be within the Meaning of these Articles.

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The *Portugal Alliance*, when rightly understood is highly for the Honour of the late Ministry, and therefore the true State of it is concealed: And there was also a good Reason for taking no Notice in this Place of the Duke of *Savoy*. This was another great Service of the late Ministry; but 'tis plain this Author acts with still further Views, with regard to that Prince; for this is not the only proper Place in which he omits to mention him; he might have found, had he been in Humour, as many Faults in our Treaty with *Savoy*, as in that with *Portugal*; for as the gaining him from *France* was a great Point, so very advantageous Articles were granted for it; how then could he escape the Lash of this unmerciful Censor? This we may be sure is not for nothing; there is a Mystery in it which perhaps I may explain before I end these Papers: At present I shall only say, that in this Author's Scheme some use is hop'd to be made of him towards diverting the House of *Austria* of their Right to the *Spanish* Monarchy, and by that Means facilitating an ill Peace.

Having thus accounted for our Author's Silence with respect to the Duke of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Savoy*, and the King of *Portugal*, when the Mention of them was so much for his Purpose, they being all in Alliance with *France* at the beginning of the War, I proceed now to consider the Force of his Argument. The Debts of the Nation and the Power of *France* were the Arguments the *Tories* used against engaging in a new War. Very well! and they were the same Arguments that frightened the King into the *Treaty of Partition*. Yet his Ministers were impeach'd upon a bare Presumption of their having advised it. But *France* by the actual Possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy and the Alliances it had made, was so much an Over-match for us, that human probability ran with mighty odds on that side; and in that case,

says

says our Author, *nothing under the most extreme Necessity should force any State to engage in a War.* I say so too; but then I affirm, *that was our Case, and so thought all those who advised entering into the War; They alledged how dangerous it would be for England, that Philip should be King of Spain, that we could have no Security for our Trade, while that Kingdom was subject to a Prince of the Bourbon Family, nor any Hopes of preserving the Balance of Europe, because the Grandfather would in effect be King, while his Grandson had but the Title, and thereby have a better Opportunity than ever of pursuing his Design of Universal Monarchy.*

The Arguments for entering into the War may be set in a stronger Light, but I am content to take them in his own Words: The Preservation of our Trade, of our Establishment, and of the Balance of Europe, which could none of them be tolerably safe while the Spanish Monarchy was suffer'd to be in the House of Bourbon, were of the utmost Concern for the Welfare of the Nation, and *nothing, to use this Author's Words, but the most extreme Necessity should force a Nation tamely to submit to such a Usurpation, as in all human Probability must in a few Years bring on them certain Destruction.* But that we were not under that extreme Necessity, the Event, God be thank'd, has sufficiently shewn. To set now this matter in a true Light, whether we should enter into a new War or not, was a point that deserved the most careful Consideration, a great deal might be said on both sides; the Danger of suffering France to continue in the quiet Possession of the Spanish Monarchy was allow'd on all Hands, the Dispute was, whether there was a possibility of preventing by a War the Danger that threatned us? Those who were against a War, thought of two Evils the least was to be chosen, that if we kept Quiet, the Danger was at some Distance, and the greater the Distance, the more room for some lucky Chance that might alter the

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the Face of things, and with these Reasons and Fears
 Party and Passion mixed themselves, as it almost al-
 ways happens in free Countries. The *Tory* M——y
 the King had taken in found they were but upon a very
 uncertain foot, and that he did not heartily go into
 them. This made them apprehensive he would in a
 little time change Hands again, as in Effect he be-
 gan to do before he dy'd, that then the Administra-
 tion would return into that Set of Men, that they had
 the greatest Aversion to. All the ill Consequences that
 arose from the ill Humour of the Parliaments, from
 their Slowness to give Money, and the Insufficiency
 of the Funds, which unavoidably occasion'd high In-
 terest and great Discounts, were imputed solely to
 these Ministers; and while Credit was in such an
 ill State at home, 'twas impossible any thing could
 go well abroad; the Differences would have conti-
 nu'd between the King and his Parl——ts, and the
 Publick Credit and the Management of the War must
 have been upon the same ill foot as before, in spite
 of all the M——y could do. This made wise and
 honest Men exceeding fearful of the Consequences
 of entering into a new War: in which 'twas impos-
 sible to succeed without Credit and Union at home,
 and that under these Appearances there was little
 Hopes of. Besides, the extreme ill State of the
 King's Health made it impossible for him to com-
 mand in *Flanders* himself; and they did not then
 know how the Place of so great a General could be
 supply'd; or at least his Authority and Influence over
 the *States* and a *Confederate* Army they thought could
 not: And his Death at the beginning of a new War
 they apprehended would throw all things into Con-
 fusion, and dissolve the Alliances, that his Credit
 and Reputation were the chief Cement of. 'Twas
 these Considerations made the *Tory* M——y and their
 Friends think, that upon the whole a War was not ad-
 visable,

visible, but others were of another Mind, they had a better Opinion both of the King himself and his M—s, and hoped that things might be managed better than they had been; that the Greatness of the Danger we were expos'd to, would makens lay aside our Heats, and unite us at home, and that the People wou'd join heartily with the King, and enable him with effectual Supplies to carry on the War with Vigour, and then Credit would revive of Course, and all things would go well, which ever side he took into the M——y. And in a new Parliament called to give his Majesty the fresh Sense of the Nation upon this important Subject, tho' their Affection to the King appear'd by their Impeachments, towards the latter end of the Session they advised him to make Alliances, and assured him, he should be supported in them. But what is of most weight in this Question, was the King's own Sense of it. He knew the Affairs of *Europe* better than all his M——y together, and was a very good Judge of the Interests of the Empire and the House of *Austria*, of the Power of *France*, and of the imminent Danger *England* and *Holland* were expos'd to by the Seizure of the *Spanish* Monarchy. And he used his utmost Endeavours to make the Nation sensible of the Necessities of a War, which could alone prevent the Ruin of them and the *States*. And that the King was very sincere in his Opinion, we are very sure from the Treaty of *Partition*, which sufficiently shewed he had no mind to enter into a new War, if it could possibly be avoided. For that was plainly the Design of that Treaty, the ill Success of the former War, the Difficulties his Affairs were perplex'd with, the Heats and Divisions of his Subjects, the Treatment he met with from his Parl——ts and his own ill Health, all together broke his Spirits, he had no Heart to think of a new War; but was willing to

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purchase Rest at any rate for the Remainder of his Days. And this he has been very liberally upbraided with by those who were so angry at the *Partition Treaty*, that he gave up the Interest of the Nation to his own Ease, and did not care what became of the rest of the World, so he were but quiet himself. But if this Prince, who was so weary of War, so desirous to be at ease, if he was of Opinion a new War was upon the Violation of the *Partition Treaty* absolutely necessary, his Judgment will have more Weight with all impartial Men, than all that this Author or his Friends at this Distance can say to the contrary. To dispute now the Necessity of the War, is the same thing as to dispute the Necessity of the *Revolution*; we are sure those who were best Judges of both, when things were fresh, and they had the full View of all before them, thought both necessary; but when the Distance of our Dangers has made us forget the Greatness of them, we are to be taught that neither was so, by designing Men, who take Advantage of our Ignorance or Forgetfulness to impose on us the falsest Reasonings, by a Misrepresentation of Facts, which the Generality of Readers are not able to judge of at ten or twenty Years Distance, when many of the most material Circumstances are forgot; and they are to judge by such only as these Writers think fit to give them, and those are pick'd and cull'd at their own Pleasure, and either are partially represented, or quite alter'd, as best serves their Turn. But honest and impartial Men will be upon their Guard; they won't be beat out of their Senses, and believe every absurd Notion that shall be started, because they don't distinctly remember all that relates to a Matter that was transacted many Years since. A Man that was once perswaded of the Necessity of the War, has as much Right to maintain his Conclusion that it is necessary, though

though he does not carry in his Mind exactly all the Proofs of it, as a Mathematician has to abide by a Proposition in *Euclid*, though he has forgot some part of the Demonstration; he is sure he could demonstrate it once, and therefore is satisfied 'tis true, tho' he can't readily prove it, it being many Years perhaps since he look'd into the Proof of it. And as it would be great Impudence to tell such a Man a Proposition is false that he knows is true, and to go about by specious Arguments to make him believe the contrary, 'tis no less impudent or absurd to pretend to prove at this time of Day to a true *Britain*, that there was no Necessity for our entering into the War, when we are under the greatest Conviction of the Truth of the contrary; and it has been so long the unanimous and undisputed Sense of the Nation.

This Author does indeed allow the Case of the *Dutch* to be extremely dangerous, as they have set forth in their Declaration of War; but then he says, *The Grounds of their Quarrel are such as only affect themselves, or at least more immediately than any other Prince or State; and that they were nearest and most exposed to the Fire.* What then? Were not we near enough to be burnt, because they were a little nearer? Men that can remember that Juncture of Affairs, must own they could not think of it without trembling, the Danger was so extremely great; and what is very remarkable, 'tis probable nothing saved *Holland* so much as the Backwardness *England* shew'd to come into the War. *France* hop'd we should be content to lie still, if they did not press too hard upon *Holland*, and that Consideration diverted the Storm, and gave them time to make Alliances, and provide for their Defence; but the very sight of so near a Danger was sufficient to convince us it was not our Business to lie still, but to rouse ourselves

selves while we could, since such an *exorbitant Power*
 might at any time execute the Destruction it then
 threatned; and when they shall ever be ruin'd, our
 Turn is next; and next to the nearest sure is near
 enough, though this Author would perswade us, we
 are no more concern'd to be one of the *Principals* in
 this War than *Prussia*, or any other Power that came
 afterwards into that Alliance; than which nothing
 can be more false, unless the Preservation of *Great-*
Britain be of no more Consequence, than that of a little
 Dukedom or petty State. Shall we be no more con-
 cern'd at the *exorbitant Power of France*, which brings
 our *Liberty and Trade* into the utmost danger, than
 People who have neither Liberty nor Trade to be con-
 cern'd for, and can suffer little by the Change, whatever
 Masters they are under? Is the Preservation of *England*,
 which is the great Support of the Protestant Reli-
 gion, of no Consequence? And if it be, shall we
 not think it in Danger from *France*, because some
 other States have nothing to apprehend upon this
 Head, as being of the same Religion with the *French*?
 But suppose all other Princes and States in the Al-
 liance as much expos'd to *France* by the Usurpation
 of the *Spanish* Monarchy as our selves; what if they
 are so feeble that they can't help themselves, or so
 indolent that they won't, or that they are govern'd
 by a Faction in the *French* Interest, must we therefore
 be insensible of our Danger, or not exert our selves
 to prevent it? By this Author's Argument, *Prussia*,
Savoy, *Portugal*, or any other small State, should
 contribute as much to the War as *Great-Britain*,
 because they are as much interest'd in it; and if
 more, they should contribute more. *Those who must*
in course be the greatest Sufferers, ought, he says, to
bear the greatest Weight, without considering their
 Strength. And this he illustrates by a very apt
 Comparison: *If a House be on fire, the Owner is sure*

to be undone first, and it is not impossible that those at next Door may escape by a Shower from Heaven, &c. Lord have Mercy upon us, if this is all we have to trust to. 'Twould be a pretty Sight when a House is on Fire, to have a Consultation held in the Neighbourhood what each should do towards extinguishing it, and it should be seriously debated how many Buckets and Hands each should employ, and the Council should end in this wise Resolve, that the Number of Buckets and Hands should be in exact Proportion to the Nearness each was at to the House where the Fire began. This is so ridiculous a Rule, that it would be impossible to be comply'd with, unless Peoples Abilities also were exactly proportion'd to the Nearness of the Danger; and if no body would do their part, or more than their part, till the rest of their Neighbours did theirs, I humbly conceive the whole Neighbourhood would be burnt out. Suppose a *Lord*, a *Merchant*, a *Draper*, a *Mechanick*, and a poor *Alms-house* were next to one another; that a Fire broke out in this last, and the *Lord's* House particularly were next the Water, would not any body think this *Lord* a Mad-man, who had a great Number of Servants about him, and more Buckets perhaps than the whole Street, if he would not suffer a Bucket to be touched, or a Hand to stir, till the poor *Alms-Women* had furnish'd their part, in proportion to the Danger, though they have not perhaps one Servant nor one Bucket, and must inevitably perish without Help? Or shall he stay to see this House burnt, and the next on Fire, and whether the *Mechanick* and the rest do their part, for Fear of doing more than his Share? If what this Author advances concerning other States, to prove that we should do no more, be Sense, so is this; and if this be not Sense, no more is the other. 'Tis his own Comparison, and there is in the

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the Cases no Difference, If a House is in so much Danger of Fire, that nothing can save it but a Shower from Heaven, a Man must be mad that won't do all he can to extinguish it; and so are we if we don't exert our selves to our utmost, in case our Danger be as great.

But because the Danger was nearest *Holland*, our Author thinks we ought to have acted only as *Auxiliaries*: This is so extraordinary a Reason, that if it be good, it must destroy all Alliances. If *England* ought not to have enter'd into the *Grand Alliance*, because *Holland* was more concern'd, no more should any other Power in *Europe*, since neither the Dangers nor the Abilities of any two States can be exactly equal; and therefore there can be no Allowance where all Parties shall be *Principals*. Tho' in the last War this Writer allows the *Empire*, *England* and *Holland*, were all *Principals*, and he does not pretend to find any Fault with it. I must observe, that a Year ago the Cant of the Party was not settled, nor were they agreed what Sense certain Words were to be used in; for in the *Letter to the Examiner*, *Principals* is opposed to *Confederates*, and means the engaging further than any of the other *Confederates*, in the Expence and Burden of the War; but no Fault is there found with our entering into the *Grand Alliance*; on the contrary 'tis commended: but here in this Writer, *Principals* is taken in a new Sense, and opposed to *Auxiliaries*: By which the Author means, that we ought not to have gone into the *Grand Alliance* at all, but contented our selves to assist *Holland* with ten thousand Men only, according to an old Treaty; this, he says, would have been prudent and generous, and that the States demanded no more. True, they did not demand more, because we were by no Treaty then in being oblig'd to do more for them; but where is the Generosity of furnishing

mishing this small Quota according to the Treaties we were bound by? Or where would have been the Prudence in giving an Assistance that must needs come to nothing? But our Author, who with his Friends is greatly skilled in foreign Affairs, makes no doubt but *Holland*, with that Assistance alone, would have been able to defend their Frontiers; and if they could not, he makes no doubt in the second place, but the Spaniards would not have suffered the French to possess themselves of Flanders. Now I in my turn make no doubt, but this Author is convinced as much as I am, that all this is egregious Nonsense: First, to fancy that the Spaniards would hinder the French from possessing themselves of Flanders, when by the Treachery of the Elector of *Bavaria* they were at that time in one Night put into the actual Possession of all the strong Places in it. When this Author writes again, I desire the Favour of him to let us know, which way they could have been dispossest'd? And his other Fancy is still more absurd, that *Holland*, who could not in conjunction with *England* and *Spain* keep their Frontiers last War, should now be able to defend themselves when their Frontier is lost, against the united Force of *France* and *Spain*, with no other Assistance from *England* but that poor one of ten thousand Men. And as if these two ridiculous Assertions wanted no other Proof, but were as plain as first Principles, by help of this short Charm, I make no doubt, he gravely infers from them, That there was no sort of Necessity for us to proceed farther, although we had been in a better Condition; but our Politicians had other Views, a Grand Alliance was therefore to be made between the Emperor, England, and the States-General. Well is it for us our Politicians then were not of the Size of those who now prescribe to us; since it has been shewn to the greatest degree of Evidence, that the War was necessary, and that nothing could have been

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been so fatal to us, as to sit still and look on, while
France was over-running the rest of the World. No-
 thing was so much for the Service of *France* as this
 nonsensical Doctrine of *Auxiliaries*, since upon the
 same Foot they would have acted as *Auxiliaries* to
 the Duke of *Anjou*; by which means *Holland* and
 the *Emperor* would soon have been out of Breath,
 and must, by their own Submission to *France*, have
 shewn us the way to submit too : For had not we
 come into the War, neither of those Powers could
 have held out another Campaign; and what would
 have been the Consequence? Should we suffer them
 to be over-run? Or should we then think fit to help
 them? If the last was for our Interest, sure it was
 much more to our Purpose to help them in time,
 when our Assistance could be of some use, and not
 when they had exhausted themselves beyond reco-
 vering, by exerting their Strength all at once, and
 that without Success, as it must have been against a
 Power that was so much an Over-match : For this
 Author has before told us, That the Ballance was
 alter'd since the last War no less than *one hundred*
thousand Men on the side of France, and the Ballance
 he owns was much too strong on that side before.
 And yet the same Author who says this would make
 us believe *Holland* and the *Emperor* might have been
 Match for *France* by themselves. Men must be strange-
 ly in love with Contradictions, that can take up with
 such Stuff as this. The Plain of the Case is this: The
 Power of *France* was so exorbitant, that if *England* won't
 engage in the War, the Liberty of *Europe* must be lost,
 and the other two Powers do what they will. If they ha-
 ve a War, they are so over-match'd, that it can
 end in nothing but the Ruin of them: If for fear of
 an ill War, they leave *France* in the quiet Posses-
 sion of their Usurpations, they must resolve to sub-
 mit to such Conditions as shall be imposed on them.

Nothing

Nothing could hinder this but a vigorous Union of all the Allies; and if it were done at all, it must be done at first, without giving the Enemy time to take the proper Methods to secure the Possession of what they had usurped. This was the only Part these Powers could take to rescue the expiring Liberty of *Europe*, and *England* wisely came into it, as the only possible way to secure their *Religion, Trade, Government*, and what is the only lasting Security of all the rest, the *Protestant Succession*. And this was so far from being a hasty Step in *England*, that it had like to have been delayed too long; for tho' the King of *Spain* died the 1st of *November* N. S. 1700. the Parl—t in being was dissolved, by whose Advice I desire this Writer to inform us, by which means the King was disabled from giving any Assurances of Assistance to the Elector of *Bavaria*, and that determin'd the latter to throw himself upon *France*, and betray to them the whole *Spanish Netherlands*. The new Parl—t did not meet till *February*, about ten Days after the *Netherlands* were given up, 'twas almost the end of the Session before they advised the King to make Alliances; and the end of that Year another Parl—t was called, who approved the Advice of the former, and War was not actually proclaimed till *May* 4, 1702. about two Months after the King's Death. What now is there in this that can be said to be hasty or precipitate? When did any State deliberate so long in a case of so much Danger? What odds was it but the *Empire* had been beat in *Italy*, and *Holland* had been made a Province to *France*? 'Twas what all Men will allow *France* might have done, and it was Infection they did not: But if they had done what they had in their Power to do, what had become of our wise and mature Deliberations? What then can be more false or impudent than to say as this Author does,

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does, That without offering at any other Remedy, with-
 out taking time to consider the Consequences, or to reflect
 on our own Condition, we hastily engaged in a War that
 hath cost us 60 Millions.

But to proceed, As this Author declares our En-
 trance into the War to be against all manner of Pru-
 dence or common Reason; so he undertakes to prove
 that England is not obliged to pursue the Ends of it;
 or rather that the Restitution of Spain is not one of
 those ends. The Queen's Declaration of War, he tells
 us, does not take notice of the Duke of Anjou's Succession
 to that Monarchy, as a Subject of Quarrel. This he
 says, p. 22. & p. 16. he gives us a part of this De-
 claration. Now the Grand Design of this Book be-
 ing to persuade the Nation to an ill Peace against
 the Consent of their Allies, and the Sense of Ju-
 stice and Honour, which have always govern'd our
 Parl——ts in Matters which the Dignity of the
 Crown and the Reputation of their Country are con-
 cerned in, being a great Obstruction to such pernicious
 Measures, to remove the Scruples that will a-
 rise in honest Minds, this Author labours this se-
 cond Point extremely, and is at abundance of Pains
 to explain away the Sense and Meaning of the Trea-
 ties we are under. An ill Peace is what the whole
 Scheme of the Author aims at, this is the great
 Point which all his others center in, which he hopes
 thus to bring about. 1. To go into the Grand Al-
 liance was wrong in it self. 2. The Terms of it
 don't oblige us to insist upon the Restitution of the Spa-
 nish Monarchy. 3. The Allies are a Pack of Rogues,
 and if this was stipulated in the Articles of the Grand
 Alliance, they not having performed their Parts,
 we are not obliged to stand to it. Is not this a noble
 Scheme? Who now can scruple consenting to a Se-
 parate Peace without Spain and the Indies? What
 Difficulty can any one make against giving up such
 Allies?

Allies? How can we think our selves bound by what is not expressly mentioned in the Articles of our Treaties with them? And in a doubtful Case how can we be so nice in departing from an Alliance, which we ought not at first to have entred into? This is the Scheme contrived to break the *Grand Alliance*, and I will undertake by the same Arguments to undermine the Revolution, which Purpose this Scheme will with little Alteration as well serve, as that 'tis now used for. And I doubt not but in a little time it will; our Author having given us a plain Intimation he has it in his Thoughts, as soon as he has enabled his Friends to carry the first great Point of an *ill Peace*. For what else can be the meaning of that scandalous Intimation he gives of this, p. 39. That the *Legislature* may have occasion to change the *Succession*, if the *Necessities of the Nation* may require it. Till this Author tells us what those *Necessities* can be, and proves the *Legislature* have such a Power; I humbly beg leave to tell him, there can be no such *Necessities*, except what his Friends shall create us by an *ill Peace*; nor have the *Legislature*, I conceive, Power to change the *Succession in the House of Hanover*, without such *Necessities*, it being made by the *Union* a Fundamental Article, which our *Representatives* are chosen to preserve, but have no Power to destroy; but I shall have more occasion to speak of this, when I come to consider the *Barrier-Treaty*, by which the *Succession* is secured, and which for this Reason chiefly I presume our Author is so angry at, and makes so many Objections against, every one of which I promise to shew, is malicious, and ridiculously false.

But to return, Of the three Parts of which this noble Scheme consists, I think I have pretty well confounded the first, and shewn it was not wrong for *England* to go into the *Grand Alliance*; but that on the

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the contrary it was highly reasonable and absolute-
 ly necessary. I come now to shew there is as little
 Sense or Reason in what he advances in Proof of his
 second Point: but beg leave first to observe, That
 if all his three Points were fully proved, they
 don't prove what they are brought for. For if our
 Treaties don't oblige us to insist on the Restitution
 of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and our Allies don't deserve
 it of us? Shall we therefore be false to our selves,
 because we need not be true to them? Shall we make
 a Peace without *Spain* and the *Indies*, in the Restitu-
 tion of which we have our selves the greatest In-
 terest, because the House of *Austria* have not done
 so much as we expected, tho' perhaps they did all
 they could? Shall we not insist upon a good *Barrier*
 for the *Dutch*, or rather shall we oblige them to
 quit that which they have Possession of, because
 some Men are not pleased with them, and therefore
 take a great deal of Pains to make us out of Humour
 with the best Ally we ever had or can have, and
 who instead of being false to us, have this War out-
 done themselves, and shewn the most generous Con-
 cern for the Interest of *England*; but supposing all
 that this Writer says of them were true, shall we
 expose our selves to Danger for the Pleasure of ex-
 posing them? Shall not we insist on a good *Barrier*,
 because we are told they don't deserve of us all we
 have done towards it? Shall we lay our selves o-
 pen to all the Consequences of an insecure Peace,
 and in complaisance to the *old inveterate perpetual*
sworn Enemy of our *Religion* and *Country*, sacri-
 fice our selves as well as our Allies, by receding
 from the essential Points of a good and lasting
 Peace? If this won't follow from our Author's
 Propositions, as 'tis certain it will not, all he en-
 deavours to prove, in truth proves nothing as to
 the main Point, which is all is aimed at. For tho'

our Honour might be disengaged, our Interest is not, the Safety of *England* and *Holland* especially are inseparably interwoven, and neither can stand long without the other.

Having shewn the Reader in few Words, how wide a Difference there is between this Author's Conclusion and his Premises, and that tho' the last were proved, the other would remain to be proved as much as ever; I come now to shew, that the second is absolutely false, and that *England* is obliged by her Treaties to insist on the Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy*, particularly of *Spain* and the *Indies*. To prove this we need only look into the Words of the Treaties themselves. This is so evident in the Treaties with *Savoy* and *Portugal*, that there is not so much as a Pretence for denying it. And I would be glad to know why the Articles of these Treaties are not as obligatory as those of the *Grand Alliance*. I am sure there is one Reason why they shou'd be more, and that is, that when the *Grand Alliance* was made, the Allies were in the utmost Consternation. The sudden Invasion and Seizure of the whole *Spanish Monarchy* made the Danger that threatned them appear so terrible, that any Terms while they were in that Fright, which a most unjust Usurpation had put them into, seem'd tolerable. And therefore their true Sense can't be so well judged by what they did then, as when they were come a little to themselves, and a good Campaign in *Flanders* had made them think they were in a better Condition to make a stand, than they could hope to be, when the *French* were under the Walls of *Nimeguen*. This gives a greater Validity to the subsequent Treaties, than to that of the *Grand Alliance*, and the true Sense of the Allies can be much better seen by them. Besides that General Articles are to be explain'd by particular ones,

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ones, and not particular ones by such as are conceiv-
 ed in general Terms. And therefore the best way
 to know what is meant by *an equisable and reasonable*
Satisfaction to the Emperor for his Pretension to the Spa-
nish Monarchy, is to see how the Allies have expres-
 sed themselves in their other Treaties, which Trea-
 ties can on no pretence be called the Contrivance
 of a Faction, having been made in the 2d Year of
 the War, when all Places of Trust were in the
 Hands of Men most zealously affected to the
 Church, and the Parliament perfectly of a piece
 with them. So that there can be no room
 for weakening the Force and Authority of Treaties
 made before this pretended Faction was formed, or
 as much as thought of, no body pretended to com-
 plain of wrong Measures, every body was pleased
 with the Restoration of Credit, the Successes
 of the War, and the wise and frugal Ma-
 nagement of the Treasury. It may therefore just-
 ly be presumed, that no Treaties were better confi-
 der'd, or more prudently entred into by her Ma-
 jesty than those with *Savoy* and *Portugal*, in which
 the Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy* to King
Charles is expressly stipulated. But what puts this
 Matter past all Dispute, and undeniably proves
 that the Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy*, espe-
 cially of *Spain* and the *Indies*, is no new Incident,
 started since the Grand Alliance, as this Author
 pretends, is the first Separate Article of the Grand
 Alliance in 1689, wherein *England* and *Holland* en-
 gage, *That in case the King of Spain should die with-*
out Issue, they will with all their Forces assist his Sacred
Imperial Majesty, or his Heirs, in taking the Succession
of the Spanish Monarchy lawfully belonging to that
House. Is this now a new Incident, when it appears
 'tis what the Allies oblig'd themselves to a dozen
 Years before; is this the Work of a late Faction,
 which

which is plainly as old as the *Revolution*? And since
 the Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy* is so expres-
 sly articulated for in our *Treaties* both before and since
 the *Second Grand Alliance*, shall we pretend 'twas
 not ever intended by the *Allies*, nor within the
 Meaning of the *Grand Alliance*, but the Contri-
 vance of a *Faction* here to perpetuate the *War*,
 because 'tis not in so many Words express'd, but
 only that *an equitable and reasonable Satisfaction* shall
 be procur'd the *Emperor* for his *Pretension* to the
Spanish Succession? Is it not apparent, that this
 was always the *Design* of the *Allies*, though it was
 not at the time of the *Treaty* thought proper to be
 so express'd? And don't this *Writer* know what the
Reasons were for their expressing themselves as they
 did? Had not *England* and *Holland* been frighten'd
 into an *Acknowledgment* of the *Duke of Anjou*,
 tho' in a very private, obscure, unauthoritative
 way? And did not the *Apprehension* they were
 then under make them think it impossible to re-
 cover the whole *Monarchy*, tho' they thought it
 just and necessary for their own *Defence*? But
 when *People* think themselves upon the *Brink* of
Ruin, they are glad to compound on any *Terms*;
 and would *France* have taken them at that *Advant-*
age, and hearkned to an *Accommodation*, they
 would, to prevent a *War* which seem'd so hazar-
 dous, have given up many *Points* which they had
 Right to insist on, and ought to do, as soon as
 they felt their *Ground*, and were in a *Condition*
 to support their just *Pretences* by their *Sword*:
 'Twas the particular *Circumstances* of that fright-
 ful *Juncture*, and nothing else, that made the *All-*
ies express themselves in such general Words,
 which they reserved to themselves the *Power* of
 explaining; and have both by previous and subse-
 quent *Treaties* sufficiently shewn their true *Mean-*
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g and Intention. If God should bless their Arms,
 is evident they thought the Restitution of the
 whole Monarchy ought to be insisted on as the
 Emperor's Right, and necessary for their own De-
 fence.

It appears then that this Resolution against any
 Peace without Spain, which, he says, is a new In-
 cident GRAFTED upon the Original Quarrel by the In-
 trigues of a Faction, is an express Article of the first
 Grand Alliance; and that I take to be the proper
 Place to look for the Grounds of our Original Quar-

This new Incident is also grafted in the 21st Ar-
 ticle of the Alliance between the Emperor, En-
 gland, Portugal, and Holland; and in the 6th Arti-
 cle of her Majesty's League with the Duke of Sa-
 voy. This new Incident has likewise been five times
 grafted in her Majesty's Speeches from the Throne,
 Answers to the Addresses of Parliament. It has
 been four times grafted in the Addresses of the
 House of Commons; and five times in those of
 the House of Lords; and by Both our Parties suc-
 cessively. This new Incident was grafted in the Pre-
 liminary Articles concluded by the Ministers of the
 Allies with those of the French King in the Year
 1709; and it was grafted in the Resolution of the
 States in the Year 1710, in which the other
 Allies concurr'd. So that if this new Incident, which
 her Majesty her self says, was the chief Induce-
 ment of the War, or of this Author's Original Quarrel,
 it has since been grafted upon it by the Intrigues of a
 Faction, as he ingenuously observes, her Majesty,
 her Parliaments, and her Allies, are the Faction
 that have done it. And is not this now a very
 modest and judicious Reasoner, fit to be employ'd
 in writing for such a Peace? Not to mention that
 quaint Expression of grafting an Incident upon a
 Quarrel, because we must always expect to meet
 with

with those Tinsel Figures, when such Men or their Masters will be scribbling about Politicks; but shall the Resolutions of Both Houses, confirm'd by the Queen, be call'd by such Writers *the Intrigues of a Faction*? What will become of our Constitution, if the most sacred Sanctions of it are to be treated in so insolent a manner? Nay, what will become of the Nation it self? Who will treat with us, or trust us? And what a Figure shall we make in Europe, if as often as Alterations are made at Court, those that come into Power shall pervert all that has been done by their Predecessors, and cancel the Resolutions of her Majesty and our Parliaments, which have been made by both Parties alternately, and in which they themselves have concurr'd?

To explain away the Meaning of all Treaties by the Help of a few general Words in one, which at the same time 'tis so easy to account for, is just as reasonable as the Pretence of the *Jacobites* and their Friends to destroy the Validity of the *Revolution* by virtue of a single Clause of *Non-Resistance*, in the famous Act of 12 Ch. II. in Contempt of, and in Contradiction to all the Laws made before and since in defence of the Rights of the People; as if it were fitter for the whole Body of our Laws to be explain'd away by Vertue of a few Words in a single Act made at an extraordinary Juncture, than that single Clause should be interpreted in a Sense agreeable to the Spirit of our Laws, and the very Fundamentals of our Constitution. The *Revolution* will run in my Thoughts while I am upon this Argument, for I can't but fear, that the same Faction, that are in so much hast to overturn the *Grand Alliance*, mean no less to destroy the *Revolution*; and whether they do directly mean it or not, there is so close a Connexion between the two, that the

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confounding of one will in all humane Probability
 draw after it the Subversion of the other. But had
 we no other Treaties to explain the general Words
 of the Treaty of the Grand Alliance by, the mean-
 ing of the Allies is sufficiently plain from the Ar-
 ticles of this very Treaty; for if they propos'd no-
 thing else to themselves but the procuring for the
 Emperor *Milan, Naples, and Sicily, the Lands upon*
the Coasts of Tuscany, and the Islands in the Medi-
terranean that belong to the Crown of Spain, which is
 expressly covenanted for in the 5th Article, they
 would always have express'd themselves in that
 manner, and not made use of those general Words
of an equitable and reasonable Satisfaction, under which
England and Holland meant *Spain and the Indies,*
 which the Emperor knew was their Concern as
 much, or rather more, than his; and therefore if
 they were for certain Reasons content that *Spain*
 and the *Indies* should not be mentioned by Name,
 the Emperor was satisfy'd, as long as those Parts
 were named, in which his own Safety was most
 immediately involved. That the Allies intended
 to explain these Words, so as to take in the Resti-
 tution of the whole Monarchy, if they were in
 Condition to insist on it, is plain from hence, and
 has ever since been so understood; and no longer
 ago than last Year, the Author of the *Letter to the*
Examiner so little dreamt of the Notions that have
 been started since, that he freely owns, That to
restore the Spanish Monarchy to the House of Austria,
 was one of the *wise Motives of this War.* And the
 same thing is confessed by the Lords in their *Repre-*
sentation in February last; and from thence we may
 be sure 'twas then the Sense of the M——y.

But 'tis time to have done with this Argument;
 I shall now turn my self to my Author, and let the
 World see he is as good at corrupting Witnesses,
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and those not private ones, but the most publick and solemn Acts, as he is at imposing weak and false Reasonings, of which we have three scandalous Instances in a very small Compass: One in the Piece he gives us of the *Queen's Declaration of War*, and two others in the Translation of one single Article of the Grand Alliance. P. 16. he tells us, the *Queen's Declaration* is grounded on the Grand Alliance, and then gives this Extract of it, that it recites the *French King's keeping in possession a great part of the Spanish Dominions, seizing Milan, and the Spanish Low Countries, &c.* Now in the *Declaration between Spanish Dominions and seizing Milan*, are these very remarkable Words, *exercises an absolute Authority over all that Monarchy, having seized Milan, &c.* Were these Words, does any body think, left out by chance, or for nothing? No, by no means; 'twas for our Author's Purpose to affirm, as he does, p. 22. that the *Q—n's Declaration takes no notice of the Duke of Anjou's Succession to that Monarchy, as a Subject of Quarrel.* But don't the Words I have quoted in effect say the thing, tho' they forbear the Name? They certainly do, and that no doubt was the true Reason they were left out. But our Author is not content to suppress a very material Part of one Evidence, but does in the most shameful manner falsify another in two Places of the 8th Article of the Grand Alliance, p. 68. first in these Words: *Nor is Peace to be made without having first obtain'd a just and reasonable Satisfaction for his Cæsarean Majesty, and for his Royal Majesty of Great-Britain, and a particular Security to the Lords the States General, of their Dominions, Provinces, Titles, &c.* Now the true Translation of the Original Words is this: *No Peace shall be made unless an equitable and reasonable Satisfaction for his Imperial Majesty, and the particular Security of the Kingdoms, Provinces, Domi-*

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nions, &c. for his Majesty of Great Britain and the States General be first obtain'd; whence now arises this great Difference between the two Translations, was it because our Author did not understand the Original? Why then did he not give us this Article as 'tis translated in the *general Collection of Treaties*, which was much easier to do, than to be at the pains to translate so long an Article himself, had it not been to serve a Purpose. He would have us believe we had no Quarrel with France but his owning the Pretender, P. 16, 22. and other Places, which he thinks was a trifling Quarrel, and might easily have been made up. For the French Court declar'd they did not acknowledge the Pretender, but only gave him the Title of King which was allow'd by Augustus to the King of Sweden; how much Falsehood in so few Words! First what King Augustus was allow'd, was by Treaty; Secondly, He was not allow'd to style himself King of Poland, but King only; and therefore this is not applicable to the Case of the Pretender, who was styled not simply King James, as the other was King Augustus, but his *Britannick Majesty*, and King of Great Britain, for the Truth of which I refer to all the *Paris Gazettes* and other publick Papers. 'Tis therefore false to say he had only the Title of King, but was not acknowledged; but the Author's Scheme requir'd he should say this, and to support it, he translates the 8th Article in such a manner, as to make us think, nothing else was meant but that Satisfaction should be made the King for this Indignity and great Affront put on him. But if we let this Article speak its true Sense, it covenants for the Security of his Majesty's Kingdom, Dominions, Navigation and Commerce, as well as for those of the States General, the contrary to which this Author would feign have thought, both to reflect upon the King, and lessen as much as may

be the particular Interest *England* has in the Grand Alliance. And to take away all Possibility of a Pretence, that this was not a wilful and designed Corruption, a Satisfaction for the Emperor, and a Security for *England* and the States, is the Language that runs thro' the whole Treaty; and in the Article but just before this, we have these Words, For obtaining the Satisfaction aforesaid for his Imperial Majesty, and the aforesaid Security for his Britannick Majesty and the States. Can we suppose this Writer did not read the whole Treaty, or not so much as cast his Eye upon the Article immediately preceding this, which it was so much for his Purpose to pervert? No sure, this Corruption in so important an Article, must be allowed to be a Master-piece of Cunning, nor the Work of a Vulgar Hand, or of a *Swift Pen*; and the Author with Reason thought himself safe from a Discovery by the very Greatness of the Crime, which is such, that a Man must be lost to all Honesty, before he can be suspected to be guilty of it.

So much for this Passage; the other is still more scandalous. A little lower in this Article, 'tis covenanted, Particularly that the French may never be in Possession of the Spanish West Indies, and that they may not have the Liberty of Navigation for Convenience of Trade under any Pretence whatsoever, neither directly nor indirectly; except it is agreed, that the Subjects of Great Britain and Holland may have full Power to use and enjoy all the same Privileges as they did use and enjoy at the time of the King of Spain's Death. Would not any Man think by these Words that the French by this Article are no otherwise excluded from trading to the Spanish West Indies, but on Supposition that *England* and *Holland* are deny'd the Use and Enjoyment of the same Privileges they had formerly? And that if they are allow'd to use and

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and enjoy those Privileges, that then the Exclusion of France from that Trade is at an end? This and nothing else can be the meaning of these Words, and it most admirably suited our Author's Design, which is to persuade us to suffer the French to have a free Trade to the Spanish West Indies, if they will allow us the same we had before, in direct Contradiction to the Interest of England, and the plain Sense of this Article, which ought to be, and in the Collection of Treaties is translated thus—
And particularly that the French shall never get into the Possession (or make themselves Masters) of the Spanish Indies, neither shall they be permitted to sail thither (or send any Ships thither) on the Account of Traffick (or to exercise Trade there) directly or indirectly on any Pretence whatsoever; there ends that Clause.—Then follows, *and lastly, (the said Peace shall not be concluded) unless full Liberty be granted to the Subjects of the King of Great Britain and the States General, to exercise and enjoy all the same Privileges, &c. as they did use and enjoy at the King of Spain's Death.* Thus we see it is an express and full Exclusion of the French from the Spanish Trade in the Indies upon any Pretence whatsoever. And a Peace made on other Terms will be made in Violation of a very material Article, which this Writer has the Impudence to falsify to that Degree, as to make it speak contrary to its true Meaning, to cover Designs they dare not own.

But this Article, he says, was quoted to put the Matter out of Dispute: And so indeed it does: For if there were no other Article in all our Alliances, we are bound not to give Spain and the Indies to the House of Bourbon by this very Article which he has produc'd to justify it. The Article says, No Peace is to be made without a Security that France and Spain shall never be united: But if the House of Bourbon has both, what

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possible *Seniory* can be given that they shall never be united & is it impossible for the *Duchess* or the Duke of *Anjou* to die without Children? And what then can hinder these Kingdoms from being united under one Prince, as they already are under one Management? Shall we depend upon a new Renunciation made by any of the Descendants in a right Line from *Lewis XIV.* I should be glad to see any of the Friends of *France* propose to us for Security a *French* Renunciation. This is I believe one of those few things which they will not have the Confidence to do.

But the Article says further, as I have already shewn, That no Peace shall be made till we have Security that the *French* shall never be in Possession of the *Spanish West Indies*: And I would fain know how we shall be secur'd of this, if *Spain* be given to the House of *Bourbon*. Are not the *French* at this time in Possession of the *Spanish West Indies*? Have they not Settlements there in *Lima* and other Places? Or have they promis'd our Negotiators of Peace, that for their sakes they will quit those Settlements? If they have not done this, and will not be as good as their Word, then I say, we cannot make Peace with them upon the Terms propos'd, if there were no Article against it but this, which is here judiciously refer'd to: We neither have, nor ever can have, a sufficient Provision that *France* and *Spain* shall never be united. And we are so far from being assur'd that the *French* shall never be in Possession of the *Spanish West Indies*, that we know they are possess'd of good Part of them already, and have more granted to them by a Treaty with the Duke of *Anjou* and his Grandfather; so that I might venture to put the whole Issue of the Dispute between this worthy Author and his Opponents upon the Construction of this single Article, which he has oblig'd

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ged the World with a Translation of: Such an ad-
 mirable Reasoner he is upon Matters of Fact! Nay,
 allowing all his contents for, that the *Allies de-*
mand no more for the Emperor and Great Britain than
a just and reasonable Satisfaction; I would even in this
 Case ask the Reader whether it is any more than a
 just and reasonable Satisfaction for the Emperor,
 that he should have those Dominions, which the
 King of *France* has solemnly renounc'd for him-
 self and his Descendants, and which the House
 of *Austria* has an undoubted Right to? Is it any
 more than a reasonable Satisfaction for *Great Britain*,
 that *France*, which has so lately broken two Tre-
 aties with us, that of *Bywick*, and that of the *Par-*
is, should never be trust'd again without ef-
 fectual Security, nor left in a Condition to bring
 either the Pretender? And can there be a suffici-
 ent Security to the States General, or to any other
 State in Christendom for their Dominions, when
 the exorbitant Power of *France* shall be streng-
 thened by the Riches of the *Indies*? What
 after this will the *French* give, that when e-
 ver they please they cannot take away; and
 what will they leave that they can? How
 often must one repeat that the King of *France*
 governs his Grandson, which if he lives but three
 Years more will be enough to do our Business? And
 that in the mean time he has Treaties for Ports, for
 Ports, for Settlements, and for Trade, which are al-
 ready executed? What therefore do these Peace-m-
 akers mean by telling us of a *reasonable Satisfaction*, or a
 sufficient Security, without *Spain* and the *Indies*? These
 Arguments are so noisy, and yet so empty; so
 weak, and yet so sufficient; so florid, and yet so
 senseless, that God forbid the chief Director of the
 Work should be trust'd alone with any cunning
Frenchman, tho' his Intentions were never so zealous
 for

for the Interest and Safety of his own Country
 That his this useful Author explain'd an Article
 in one Treaty; and I doubt not but we shall find
 him acting with the same Sincerity in the Account
 he gives of other Treaties, when we come to look
 into them: But that I have not now time for
 Having sufficiently discover'd the wicked Design
 of this vile Book, and pointed at general Solutions
 of almost all the Fallacies 'tis filled with; and give
 such ample Proofs of the Writer's Integrity and Ho-
 nesty, which has swelled these Papers much beyond
 my Expectation, I shall reserve my particular An-
 swers to the several Facts alleg'd for a *Quintessence*
 which shall be publish'd in very few Days; and
 it shall be fully consider'd all that the *Partisans* of
France have said, or can say against the *Allies* in
 the late M—y. In the mean time I desire
 honest and impartial Men to suspend their Judg-
 ments, and not hastily believe upon this
 Author's bare Word, that we are under any
 Necessity of concluding, against the *Confederates*
 our *Allies*, and in Breach of so many *Treaties*,
 most just, necessary and successful War, by a
 dangerous and insecure Peace.

F I N I S

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 stons Church-yard, near the North-entrance of the
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